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ABSTRACT The current landscape of the core Internet technologies shows considerable centralisation
with the big tech companies controlling the vast majority of traffic and services. This situation has sparked
a wide range of decentralisation initiatives with blockchain technology being among the most prominent
and successful innovations. At the same time, over the past years there have been considerable attempts
to address the security and privacy issues affecting the Domain Name System (DNS). To this end, it is
claimed that Blockchain-based DNS may solve many of the limitations of traditional DNS. However, such
an alternative comes with its own security concerns and issues, as any introduction and adoption of a new
technology typically does - let alone a disruptive one. In this work we present the emerging threat landscape
of blockchain-based DNS and we empirically validate the threats with real-world data. Specifically, we
explore a part of the blockchain DNS ecosystem in terms of the browser extensions using such technologies,
the chain itself (Namecoin and Emercoin), the domains, and users who have been registered in these
platforms. Our findings reveal several potential domain extortion attempts and possible phishing schemes.
Finally, we suggest countermeasures to address the identified threats, and we identify emerging research
themes.
INDEX TERMS Blockchain, Blockchain Forensics, Cybercrime, DNS, Malware
I. INTRODUCTION
One could argue that there is a periodic paradigm bounce
between centralisation and decentralisation in computer sci-
ence. A representative example is the transition from main-
frames with dummy terminals to personal computers or the
shift from centralised local storage to the cloud. Although
the Internet was in principle designed to be distributed and
decentralised by nature, in reality, the control is placed onto
a relatively limited number of stakeholders and the quest for
further decentralisation is becoming an imminent need. Such
requirement manifests in many ways, see for example the
case of net neutrality, or the concept of crowdsourcing which
attempts to address efficiency and sustainability issues. As
such, in recent years, we are witnessing an increasing demand
and creation of decentralised services.
A noteworthy example of decentralisation is the
blockchain technology, which is being widely deployed in
various and diverse fields [1]. In different forms, the decen-
tralisation wave is gradually reaching traditional centralised
services, such as DNS. DNS is a distributed database with
a centralised data governance model, primarily controlled
by ICANN. In this regard, ICANN manages the top-level
domains (TLDs) and the operation of root name servers. In
practice, in order for a client to contact a host of a particular
domain name, it first issues a query to a DNS server to obtain
the host’s IP address. For efficiency the DNS server may
maintain a copy of this information in its cache, depending
on how often this domain is requested. In the case where
the DNS server does not hold the information requested, the
query is propagated to the root name server which can find
the servers for the corresponding TLD and then forward the
query to the corresponding authoritative name server which
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would return the corresponding IP.
While DNS is currently one of the oldest yet critical
Internet application-level protocols, it has several drawbacks
that mandate its replacement. For instance, DNS does not
support cryptographic primitives by default. Although DNS
supports security extensions through DNSSEC, these are not
widely used. As a result, any query and response can be
intercepted by anyone on the same network, exposing this
service to numerous threats, primarily through man-in-the-
middle type of attacks. Indicatively, there can be confidential-
ity and privacy violations through passive eavesdropping, as
well as integrity breaches since anyone on the same network,
may inject a response of an intercepted query. Moreover,
totalitarian regimes can exploit DNS to censor unwanted web
pages and services. Furthermore, in the past years the DNS
servers have been both attack targets - see for example DNS
poisoning attacks - as well as components of an attack vector,
as they have been used in amplification denial of service
attacks.
Motivation: The issues above have driven the research com-
munity to seek alternative solutions to DNS. Some initiatives
include DNS over HTTPS [2] and DNS over TLS [3] and
[4] while others are looking into solutions to provide alterna-
tives to ICANN’s centralisation paradigm. One of the most
promising decentralised solutions is blockchain DNS which
has already been adopted by several chains such as Ethereum,
Namecoin and Emercoin. Despite being in their infancy,
blockchain domains have attracted the interest of several
prominent stakeholders. A notable example is Alibaba, who
recently filed a patent for a blockchain-based domain name
management system1. A brief overview of blockchain DNS
together with some degree of scepticism is presented in [5].
To date, blockchain DNS is already being exploited by cyber-
criminals2. Therefore, we argue that there is a need to explore
threat models related to novel blockchain solutions 3, as well
as decentralised file storage systems [6]. The decentralisation
of services may undoubtedly provide a plethora of possi-
bilities in terms of privacy, security and democratisation.
Nevertheless, substantial changes in the backbone of well-
established services and infrastructures may come at a high
cost. Adversaries are expected to opportunistically take ad-
vantage of such changes by exploiting the lack of knowledge,
experience and maturity of the users and deployments, as
well as the inherent flaws that exist in the early stages of
a new technology. At the same time, the use of encrypted
and covert communications adds another layer of difficulty
to detect infected systems [7], for instance, in the case of
botnets. Therefore, it is imperative to raise awareness on the
opportunities as well as the emerging security threats. This
paper aims to fill this research gap by providing an overview
of the current state of the art and practice (Section II), a
1https://domainnamewire.com/2019/08/15/alibaba-files-blockchain-
domain-name-patent-application/
2https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/how-
cybercriminals-are-using-blockchain-dns-from-the-market-to-the-bazar/
3https://en.bitcoinwiki.org/wiki/Blockchain_Projects_List
detailed presentation of the emerging threats and how they
could be amplified (Section III). Further to merely speculat-
ing future threats, we perform an investigation and analysis
of the currently available blockchain DNS ecosystem and
illustrate the presence of risks. To this end, in Section IV,
we showcase the results of an in-depth analysis of Namecoin,
Emercoin and Blockchain DNS. Our findings show that there
are ongoing domain extortion activities and indicate that
possible phishing campaigns have already been deployed. It
should be noted that the threats discussed and the conclusions
drawn from the statistical analysis could be extended to
other Blockchain DNS systems. Finally, some remarks and
findings are further discussed, along with possible counter-
measures in Section V.
To the best of our knowledge, the previous work in this
field was limited to the research by Kaodner et al. [8] back
in 2011 who analysed the Namecoin domain. The authors
studied an early version of the Namecoin domain; however,
they identified issues such as domain squatting which was an
anticipated threat. In our work, the analysis is considerably
extended by providing a detailed study of Namecoin and
Emercoin data in terms of domains, addresses and their
corresponding timelines. We perform an analysis and empir-
ical evaluation of the current state of practice in real-world
blockchain DNS systems. Moreover, we identify extortion
schemes, pricing schemes and discuss both domain squatting
and typo squatting. The recent high rate of domain regis-
trations and the observation that particular parties registered
a considerable number of domains - some in the order of
thousands - indicate that blockchain DNS in its current state
may not constitute a safe and secure ecosystem. As such, the
broader adoption of such solutions, despite their attractive
features, should be approached with scepticism.
II. BACKGROUND
A. BLOCKCHAIN-BASED DNS
Decentralised systems were in principle used to improve
the robustness and availability of domain name resolution
tasks as well as enabling the feature of bypassing censorship
campaigns and tampering, as discussed in [9]–[14]. Some of
the research initiatives in this area focused on developing
specific TLDs, such as in the Dot-P2P project (with the
.p2p TLD) [15]. In this regard, although the idea of using
P2P networks to perform distributed domain name resolution
was interesting, their performance entailed several drawbacks
[16]. Nevertheless, only up until recently, the adoption of
distributed DNS is becoming progressively gaining ground
[5], mainly due to the inherent features of blockchain tech-
nology, such as immutability, verifiability, and trust. These
features, when introduced to registrar systems, can enable
functional and real-world scale distributed DNS systems.
According to Scopus, Web of Science and Google Scholar,
a set of approaches, some of which are fully functional, have
appeared in the literature since 2016. In what follows, we
describe and analyse the main features of the most relevant
and adopted solutions. The work presented by Hari et al. [17]
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is one of the first works that propose the use of blockchain
to develop a DNS infrastructure. The authors discuss the
benefits of such a system over the main threats and drawbacks
of traditional models such as compromised hosts, spoofing,
trust management, and its heavy dependence on PKIs. Ben-
shoof et al. [18] proposed a system named D3NS, which
uses a distributed hash table and a domain name ownership
implementation based on the Bitcoin blockchain. They aim
to replace the top-level DNS and certificate authorities, of-
fering increased scalability, security and robustness. Liu et
al. [19] proposed a blockchain-based decentralisation DNS
resolution method with distributed data storage to mitigate
single points of failure and domain name resolution data
tampering. Gourley and Tewari [20] proposed the use of
blockchain to enhance the certificate validation procedure
to create an improved DNS security extension, providing
the same benefits with DNSSEC while overcoming its main
drawbacks. Similarly, in an attempt to reduce the level of
trust in certificate authorities, Guan et al. [21] presented
AuthLedger, a blockchain-based system that provides effi-
cient and secure domain name authentication. BlockZone,
of Wang et al. [22], uses a replicated network of nodes to
offer efficient name resolution through an improved PBFT
consensus mechanism.
Some work focused on IoT systems, and their communica-
tion protocols have also been proposed. For example, Duan
et al. [23] presented DNSLedger, a hierarchical multi-chain
structure in which domain name management and resolution
are performed in a decentralised way. The authors claim
that their system could enhance IoT-related communication
technologies due to its efficiency. BlockONS, proposed by
Yoon et al. [24], is a system that aims to overcome classical
problems related to DNS resolution, namely DNS cache
poisoning, spoofing, and local DNS cracking. The authors
propose a robust and scalable object name service appropri-
ate for an IoT ecosystem. ConsortiumDNS was introduced
by Wang et al. [25] as a system based on a three-layer
architecture composed by consortium blockchain, a consen-
sus mechanism and external storage. The authors claim that
their approach increases the efficiency of the overall system,
compared to other well-known approaches such as Namecoin
or Blockstack. Finally, a number of patented designs of
Blockchain-based DNS systems is found in [26], [27].
Currently, there are several relevant and widely adopted
blockchain DNS projects. Handshake 4 is one of the most
widely supported technologies, which aims to offer an al-
ternative to existing certificate authorities. Therefore, Hand-
shake aims to replace the root zone file and the DNS
name resolution and registration services worldwide. The
Ethereum name service (ENS)5 uses smart contracts to man-
age the .eth registrar by means of bids and recently added
the support for .onion addresses. Namecoin6 is a cryp-
4https://handshake.org/
5https://ens.domains/
6https://www.namecoin.org/
tocurrency based on Bitcoin, with additional features such
as decentralised name system management, mainly for the
.bit domain. It was the first project to provide an approach
to address Zooko’s triangle since the system is secure, de-
centralised and human-meaningful. Nevertheless, contrary to
well-established blockchains like Bitcoin, Namecoin’s main
drawback is its insufficient computing power, which makes
it more vulnerable to the 51% attack. Practically, if an ad-
versary manages to get a slight majority of the computing
power, they may rewrite the whole chain. Blockstack [28] is
a well-known blockchain-based naming and storage system
that overcomes the main drawbacks of Namecoin. Block-
stack’s architecture separates control and data planes, en-
abling seamless integration with the underlying blockchain.
EmerDNS7 is a system for decentralised domain names
supporting a full range of DNS records. EmerDNS operates
under the “DNS” service abbreviation in the Emercoin NVS.
Nebulis8 is a globally distributed directory that relies on the
Ethereum ecosystem and smart contracts to store, update, and
resolve domain records. Moreover, Nebulis proposes the use
of off-chain storage (i.e. IPFS) as a replacement for HTTP.
OpenNIC9 deserves a special mention since it is a hybrid
approach in which a group of peers manages namespace reg-
istration, yet the name resolving task is fully decentralised.
OpenNIC provides DNS namespace and resolution over a
set of domains, including those maintained by blockchain
solutions such as EmerDNS and New Nations10. Moreover,
OpenNIC resolvers have recently added access to domains
administered by ICANN. In addition to namespace registrar,
users can also create their own TLD on request. It should also
be noted that OpenNIC has recently voted to drop support
for .bit after rampant abuse from malware operators. It is
worth mentioning that this decision was taken after a voting
process by the OpenNIC members. Table 1 summarises the
main features of the most relevant Blockchain-DNS systems.
TABLE 1. Technical characteristics of the most relevant DNS systems.
Although Blockstack is blockchain agnostic, it is mainly used with Bitcoin
blockchain.
Method Pedigree Platform Registrar and
Resolution
Management
TLD Examples
ICANN Network of Servers
and resolvers
Centralised .com .net
.org
OpenNIC Decentralised
Servers
Hybrid .bbs .pirate
.libre
ENS Ethereum Decentralised .eth .onion
Handshake Bitcoin Decentralised unrestricted
Blockstack Blockchain agnostic Decentralised .id .podcast
.helloworld
Emercoin Bitcoin Decentralised .coin .bazar
.emc
Namecoin Bitcoin and Peercoin Decentralised .bit
Internet users can reach the TLDs offered by Name-
7https://emercoin.com/en/documentation/blockchain-services/emerdns/
emerdns-introduction
8https://www.nebulis.io/
9https://www.opennic.org/
10http://www.new-nations.net/
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coin, OpenNIC, New Nations, and EmerDNS (e.g. .bit,
.coin, .emc, .lib and .bazar) through various browser
extensions such as peername, blockchain-DNS and
friGate [29]. The process is outlined in Figure 1.
Blockchain DNS resolver
Domain 
resolution 
request
Device
DNS resolver
TLD analysis
Blockchain-based 
Traditional Procedure
.com
.net
.org
 ...
.coin
.bit
.bazar
 ...
FIGURE 1. Workflow of the browser extensions procedure to enable
resolution of EmerDNS, Namecoin, New Nations and OpenNIC domains. The
extension inspects the TLD of the requested domain and directs the query to
the corresponding DNS system.
B. DOMAIN NAME FRAUD
Apart from the protocol weaknesses DNS carries, there are
also several attacks on the underlying processes. For instance,
when a business registers its name on a specific TLD, an
adversary may opportunistically register the same name to
another TLD. This attack is known as domain squatting.
ICANN, being the central authority of the main TLDs, has
the capability to alleviate from such attacks. Another attack
stems from the failure of timely renewal of a domain name
once its registration has lapsed. An adversary may use auto-
mated systems to buy the domain name preemptively. This is
referred to as dropcatching.
Another attack vector emerges from the typos that people
usually make when typing. In this regard, an adversary may
register a domain that looks like a known domain, but with
a small typo. This is usually called typosquatting. A partic-
ular case of typosquatting is the exploitation of linguistic
collisions. In this attack, the adversary tries to exploit the
fact that a typo in a word may result in a word in another
language. Therefore, since the search engines correct such
errors in the search results, a malicious domain may appear
as a legitimate result of a query for the target domain,
poisoning the search results. In bitsquatting, the adversary
tries to exploit the possible network errors that may introduce
some noise in the response of a DNS server. Homograph
attacks attempt to exploit the visual resemblance of one
domain with another, registering, e.g. punycodes for target
domain names so that the IDN looks similar to it in the
browser. In soundsquatting, the adversary registers domains
that sound similar to the target domain. In combosquatting
the adversary tries to trick a user into trusting a domain
because it looks like the original, yet has some additional
words appended or prepended. The latter is something that
many legitimate sites may do as well for publicity, so the user
is accustomed to trusting them. Similarly, in AbbrevSquatting
the adversary registers a possible abbreviation of a domain
name. Since mobile devices have limited space to illustrate
information, an adversary may embed a trusted domain name
in the second-level domain names. This tactic is known as
levelsquatting. In Table 2, we provide a categorisation of the
related work in terms of attacks and scope (traditional DNS
and distributed DNS). Table 3 illustrates most of these attacks
with examples.
DNS Distributed DNS
[30]–[35] Typosquatting
[36], [37] Bitsquatting
[38] Combosquatting
[39] Soundsquatting
[40] Abbrevsquatting
[41]–[43] Homograph
[44] Levelsquatting
[45] Dropcatching
[46] Linguistic-collision
[47] Domain squatting
[8] Domain squatting
This work Domain & typo squatting
TABLE 2. Literature overview related to domain attacks
Attack Benign Malicious
Domain squatting facebook.com facebook.new
Typosquatting facebook.com facebok.com
Bitsquatting facebook.com fccebook.com
Combosquatting facebook.com yourfacebook.com
Soundsquatting facebook.com phacebook.com
Abbrevsquatting fb.com fbk.com
Homograph facebook.com faceb◦ok.com
Levelsquatting facebook.com facebook.com.maldom.com
Linguistic-collision adobe.com idobe.com
TABLE 3. Examples of types of domain fraud.
C. DISTRIBUTED PLATFORMS AND C2
Nowadays, advanced and sophisticated malware campaigns
continuously emerge, and some are already employing
the services offered by decentralised technologies such as
blockchain and distributed file storage (DFS). In the case
of botnets, the use of technologies such as DFS sys-
tems prevents the generation of non-existent domain errors
(NXDomain responses), which is a well-known Indicator of
Compromise (IoC) type for malware using domain genera-
tion algorithms. In this regard, [6] extended the definition
of domain generation algorithms (i.e. a family of pseudo-
random domain name generators to which an infected host
can dynamically identify the location of its C2 server) into
a more generic framework, namely Resource Identifier Gen-
eration Algorithms (RIGA). Moreover, the authors showed
how DFS like IPFS could enhance malware campaigns due to
their attractive features such as immutability, efficiency and
negligible costs. Botnet C2 management through Blockchain
systems is also a noteworthy threat as proposed in [48]
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FIGURE 2. An overview of main threats of blockchain DNSs.
and used in the case of the Cerber ransomware, analysed
in [49]. In this case, the malware retrieves the C2 address
from the transaction information of the bitcoin blockchain. A
more recent threat is the use of encrypted and covert com-
munication channels such as in the case of DNSSec, DNS
over HTTPS (DoH) and DNS over TLS (DoT). Although
these technologies hinder the possibility of using NXDomain
information leaks to detect suspicious behaviour, Patsakis et
al. showed that even in such case some patterns might emerge
[7], which can be used to identify and classify Domain
Generation Algorithm (DGA) families accurately. Regarding
the recently developed Blockchain-DNS systems, there are
emerging uses of these for cybercriminal activities such as
the setup of illicit market places11.
III. THE DECENTRALISED DNS THREAT
A blockchain-based DNS solution offers the features and
benefits as summarised in Table 4. In this regard, one could
argue that the traditional DNS seems to be outdated, com-
pared to the novel blockchain DNSs. In any case, the tra-
ditional DNS proved its worth in terms of reliability and
scalability from the early 80s until today with modest ad-
justments. However, blockchain-based DNSs are not short of
introducing new and emerging threats, giving opportunities
for the development of novel attack vectors [50]–[53]. In the
following sections, we present and analyse the most well-
known threats as well as identify novel ones. We also dis-
cuss their potential impact on sociotechnical systems. Figure
2 is an overview of the emerging threats surrounding the
blockchain DNS.
A. MALWARE
Malware actors are among the prime beneficiaries of
blockchain-based DNS services. This enabling technology
provides the capability to register a substantial number of
domains with low entropy. Currently, malware authors use
DGAs to generate domain names (i.e. algorithmically gen-
erated domains or AGDs); however, since most short and
meaningful domain names are not available, they resorted
11https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/how-
cybercriminals-are-using-blockchain-dns-from-the-market-to-the-bazar/
TABLE 4. Main characteristics of blockchain DNSs.
Property Description
Trust Verifiable and robust consensus mechanisms
Decentralisation The network is completely distributed with no
central entities
Availability The availability of the network depends on multi-
ple peers and not on a single entity.
Censorship-resistant Access to information and domain name resolution
are not subject to borders or bans
Robustness Resilient to attacks that affect centralised DNS
systems such as MiM, spoofing, cache poisoning,
cracking.
Unlimited Resources A high number of simultaneous users sharing their
assets.
Namespace Freedom Registration of new SLDs and TLDs
Automated Management Auctions to register domain names, fast and trans-
parent ownership control
to the use of long and random-looking domain names.
Upon infecting a host, a bot that uses a DGA issues many
Non-Existent Domain (NXDomain) requests to resolve the
C2 server. The surge of DNS queries and corresponding
NXDomain answers can be analysed, potentially providing
attribution by singling out the underlying DGA.
With the use of blockchain-based DNS systems, the con-
ventional NXDomain requests will not be issued (see next
section), hence hindering the detection mechanisms. More-
over, by using domain names with lower entropy, many filter-
ing and machine learning approaches are rendered useless.
Even more, the use of blockchain-based DNSs introduces
further challenges for malware analysts. When performing
static analysis on the reverse-engineered code, the analyst
and the tools that they use must have knowledge on the new
domains and who maintains them as the function calls can
considerably differ. Traditional filters for domain names will
fail to reveal calls to a .bit domain for instance, as the
resolution mechanism, is completely different. In fact, the use
of the blochain DNS from various botnets12 to connect to the
C2 servers has reportedly created more issues in the analysis,
attribution, and takedown. As reported by deteque13, more
than 100 domains registered in blockchain DNS registrars
were used by C2 servers in 2018 implying that their use is
actively being exploited by cybercriminals. In light of the
above, OpenNIC has recently decided14 to drop support for
.bit domains.
In addition, it should be noted that requests to agreeably
benign domains, e.g. google.com, may resolve to IP ad-
dresses not owned by the domain. The same of course applies
for case sensitive domains, e.g. GoOgle.com, or the use of
spaces, e.g. goog le.com. While Handshake, for instance,
may have already taken some precautionary measures for
the highly visited domain names, this does not prevent the
use of existing domain names with less visibility in being
12https://blog.netlab.360.com/threat-alert-a-new-worm-fbot-cleaning-
adbminer-is-using-a-blockchain-based-dns-en/ https://www.microsoft.
com/security/blog/2018/03/07/behavior-monitoring-combined-with-
machine-learning-spoils-a-massive-dofoil-coin-mining-campaign/
13https://www.deteque.com/news/abused-top-level-domains-2018/
14https://wiki.opennic.org/votings/drop_namecoin
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exploited to serve malware. Unfortunately, these DNS servers
register and may resolve domains which are case sensitive,
indicating another form of phishing and domain squatting
that could be used in the near future. It should be noted that
an adversary could still perform fast fluxing and change the
IP addresses that are used whenever deemed necessary by
simply performing a transaction in the chain. From a digital
forensics perspective however the whole history and timeline
of the fast-flux will be preserved due to the immutability
feature of the blockchain. Finally, it should be noted that
blockchain-based schemes often provide strong privacy guar-
antees, preventing law enforcement agencies from tracking
the perpetrators, providing them with the perfect cover-up for
their operations.
B. UNDERLYING REGISTRAR MECHANISM
The main approach for registering domains in blockchain
DNSs is to perform bids or auctions, replacing the first-
request, first-served concept followed in traditional, cen-
tralised DNS. However, by exploiting vulnerabilities in the
underlying bid system, an attacker may obtain control of
domains as recently observed with the apple.eth domain
grab 15. Moreover, most blockchain DNS systems such as
Emercoin allow the registration of case sensitive domains,
which is not possible in traditional systems. The latter, if
paired with some other unrestricted practices such as the
use of spaces, non UTF-8 or ASCII characters, may lead to
an explosion of the (alternative) domain namespace where
legitimate domains may not be easily distinguishable. Such
a situation is likely to raise trust issues towards the DNS
service in general. Note that the attack mentioned above
could be prevented and reverted in traditional DNS, but not
in blockchain DNSs. As such, the registration processes and
implementation of the underlying smart contracts will need
to be extensively studied.
In essence, an uncontrolled and fully decentralised DNS
type of service may lead to having parallel Internets. Note
that each blockchain DNS system enables the registration of
arbitrary sets of TLDs, which may overlap with existing ones.
Therefore, the same domain would resolve to different IPs,
depending on the blockchain DNS system used. For instance,
even if not used, the domain google.com is registered in
Emercoin in block 25236216. This opens a whole new avenue
of possibilities, in which users can have access to a myriad
of contents without restriction. Yet, in many instances, they
could be owned by a malicious entity. The latter problem, as
discussed in the following sections, is exacerbated by other
properties such as immutability.
C. DOMAIN REGISTRATION MARKET
In the least sinister scenario, we consider the case of one
registering the domain name of an existing, legitimate web-
page. Since the blockchain TLDs are not known to the vast
15https://www.coindesk.com/ethereum-name-service-auction-exploited-
to-grab-apple-domain-and-it-cant-be-undone
16https://explorer.Emercoin.com/block/252362
majority of people, it is expected that some will rush to
opportunistically buy such names requesting a good payment
in exchange for the name. As presented in more detail in
the empirical evaluation, this practice is already taking place.
Block 160356 of Emercoin17 illustrates such requests were
the fees range from $600 to $20,000.
The problem is an extension of domain backordering as in
this instance we are not dealing with expired domains, but
with new TLDs. The existence of ICANN and intermediates,
e.g. registrars, allows in many cases the arbitration or even
the shutdown or handing over of a domain name. How-
ever, blockchain systems do not support such remediation
mechanisms. In fact, at the time of writing, one can register
a name for an arbitrary amount of time in Emercoin. For
instance, there are many domain names in Emercoin which
are registered for thousands of years, e.g. there are domains
registered up to 5014 and 12012 in blocks 200590 and
380209, respectively18.
D. PHISHING
Phishing is a fraudulent practice which targets an audience to
obtain valuable personal information by using impersonation
of entities, persons and more techniques. According to the
State of the Phish 2019 by Proofpoint [54], the number of
compromised accounts by these attacks varied from 38%
to 65% from 2017 to 2018. This type of attack leverages
socially engineering methods to trick users into performing
activities that will benefit the attacker in some way, usually
financially [55]. Email is the most popular avenue for a
phishing attack, with more than 90% of successful cyber-
attacks/security breaches being initiated from a spoofed
email [56]. In fact, the automated capabilities of this attack,
coupled with the incapacity of users to identify a phishing
attack [57] may render the threat even more effective. There
are many factors which augment this threat and most relate
to the human. For instance, the timing of the attack, the
authoritative writing, as well as the exploitation of common
practices in an organisation, may significantly encourage the
user into accepting the email as legitimate. Furthermore,
the use of spoofed or compromised email accounts further
complicates the situation.
In the context of blockchain DNSs, the above issues can
be exacerbated. The users are accustomed to visiting specific
web pages and sending emails to particular accounts. If these
accounts are pointing to a similar address, e.g. changing the
TLD, many users are highly likely to be tricked. The use of
puny codes for phishing or the use of different TLDs can
become an effective ingredient of an attack vector. With the
introduction of blockchain DNSs, an adversary has far more
options as there is a wide range of domains that are becoming
available at a minimum cost. Practically, this means that not
only the phishing sites may have a similar domain name with
17https://explorer.emercoin.com/block/160358
18https://explorer.emercoin.com/block/200590 and https://explorer.
emercoin.com/block/380209
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legitimate ones, but with the use of, e.g. a Let’s Encrypt19 cer-
tificate, the fraudulent web pages may have valid and trusted
HTTPS support. Therefore, the phishing page may have all
the distinctive elements, from the UI, the HTTPS support and
the valid domain name, making it very difficult for a common
user to distinguish the original from the phishing page.
E. LACK OF MOTIVATION
Motivation under the blockchain DNS paradigm is clearly
related to the features offered by such a system, includ-
ing censorship resistance as one of the main attractions.
Nevertheless, these desirable features come at a cost, since
decentralised systems rely completely on their nodes and
their participation [58]. Therefore, keeping the user’s interest
in blockchain DNSs is critical.
Unarguably, blockchain’s adoption in a myriad of scenar-
ios is a reality [1]. Nevertheless, not all blockchain-based
projects succeed. In this regard, according to Deadcoins20
there are approximately 1000 dead cryptocurrencies and
more than 660 attempts to promote fraudulent cryptocur-
rencies. Interestingly enough, as of 2018, ICO scams have
already raised more than 1 billion dollars21. Despite the
existence of some awareness campaigns such as Howey-
Coin22, the lack of a specific and interoperable framework
to pursue such deviant behaviour enables the persistence of
these practices. In the case of blockchain, this may hinder
the creation of new projects as well as the persistence of
well-known and established ones. One of the main problems
that could arise is an unbalanced/unstable computational
power, which could compromise the underlying consensus
mechanisms and trigger, for instance, a 51% attack. Note that
this attack may be applied regardless of the number of users
that use a blockchain DNS solution, as the attack is targeted
towards the nodes that store the blockchain which, depending
on the rewards they have, their participation may decrease
over time. The latter may allow an adversary to control the
blockchain and compromise its integrity without having to
exploit any software vulnerability of the system.
F. IMMUTABILITY
The immutability property of blockchains, although standing
as one of the main beneficial features, may also be abused
for malicious purposes. Well-known blockchains such as
Bitcoin Satoshi Vision (BSV)23 and Bitcoin Blockchain have
suffered from serving as an illegal data storage than cannot be
deleted [59], [60]. The lack of verifiable deletion mechanisms
enables DFS systems such as IPFS and IndImm24 to host and
disseminate illegal content [6]. Therefore, neither contents
nor domain names are subject to a take-down mechanism.
19https://letsencrypt.org
20https://deadcoins.com/
21https://www.ccn.com/ico-scams-have-raised-more-than-1-billion-
report-claims/
22https://www.howeycoins.com/index.html
23https://bitcoinsv.io/
24https://en.cryptonomist.ch/2019/07/29/indimm-ripple-blockchain/
Moreover, strategies as blacklisting domains are unpractical
if the number of domains is high.
From a legal perspective, the GDPR does not consider
the immutable nature of blockchains and DFS. In this sense,
novel decentralised technologies implement features that are
not aligned with current regulations and their requirements,
which prevents the possibility to apply requests such as the
right to be forgotten [61], [62]. Thus, the aforementioned
facts make the combination of blockchain DNS and DFS sys-
tems a fertile playground for building malicious ventures. For
instance, at the time of writing, Emercoin supports I2P (Invis-
ible Internet Project) links; well-known for their anonymity,
however, given the continuous rise of IPFS and other DFS
solutions, blockchain DNS systems may support IPFS in the
near future. The support of a permanent and distributed stor-
age such IPFS, combined with blockchain DNS, can allow
the creation of a permanent link that cannot be taken down.
It should be noted that there are already initiatives towards
such direction, e.g. Unstoppable Domains25. Evidently, the
combination of both would be ideal for the distribution of
infringing content that would become permanently available
for everyone who has access to the link.
IV. ANALYSIS OF REAL-WORLD DATA
To assess the extent and risk of these threats, we conducted an
analysis of real-world data. In the first set of experiments, we
used the BDNS extension26 and in the second one we used the
Namecoin27 and the Emercoin28 blockchain platforms. We
argue that the most critical domain names are the top ones
as captured in the Alexa domain global ranking system29
since they handle most of the user traffic. Therefore, if an
adversary would like to take over a domain, a domain in
the Alexa top 1,000 domains would offer them the highest
impact. In addition we constructed a dataset merging the
top 1 million Alexa domains30 with the Cisco Umbrella 1
Million31 dataset.
In what follows, we will refer to A1K as the dataset of the
second-level domain (SLD) names of the Alexa top 1,000
domains collected and as TOP1m as the SLDs of the merge
of the Alexa and Umbrella top 1 million datasets at the time
of writing. The intuition behind having two distinct datasets
is that A1K is small and can be used for exhaustive search
without abusing the service provider’s resources, while the
TOP1m allows for a more extensive analysis that can be
performed offline.
A. USING THE BDNS EXTENSION
BDNS is an open-source extension for Chrome and Firefox.
The goal of the extension is to resolve .bit, .lib, .emc, .coin,
25https://unstoppabledomains.com
26https://blockchain-dns.info
27https://www.namecoin.org/
28https://emercoin.com/
29https://www.alexa.com/topsites
30http://s3.amazonaws.com/alexa-static/top-1m.csv.zip
31https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/cisco-umbrella-1-million
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.bazar and OpenNIC domains32. The extension monitors the
requests of the browser for domains. If the domain falls
within the supported TLDs, it uses a RESTful interface to
resolve the IP.
Based on this concept, we created a crawler which sends
queries using this REST interface and tries to resolve A1K
domains with any of these TLDs. The search showed that 464
domains out of the potential 25,000 web pages (i.e. generated
from the combination of A1K with the different TLDs) were
registered. These 464 web pages were mapped to 465 IPs,
as one of the DNS records mapped a domain to two IPs.
Interestingly, 21 of these IPs were private and 444 public.
The latter were actually 55 unique addresses, one of which
was used to resolve 220 of these web pages, and 81 belong
to another IP address, signifying a high concentration. In
terms of countries, these domains resolve to 15 countries, as
illustrated in Table 5.
Going a step further, we browsed each of the domains.
From the 464 domains, 163 did not resolve to a valid server
or returned an error on the server-side and 9 to a default
welcome landing page of a service, e.g. IIS Server. Then, 80
pages redirected the user to a porn web page (https://iusr.co)
which belonged to the same IP address (192.243.100.192).
Note that the latter IP served only this web page except
for one page that was down. Then, many of the pages
resolved to placeholder pages. Three of them resolved to
the same IP (161.97.219.84) pointing to “Computer Rehab
domain hosting”, 11 pointed to a parking domain of dotbit.me
with the same IP (144.76.12.6). Sixty-seven domains were
registered as part of the project New Nations http://www.
new-nations.net from a single IP (178.254.31.11). The lat-
ter IP also resolved 76 more web pages that were divided
into three placeholder web pages (ww1.partenka.net,ww17.
cikidot.com, ww38.partenka.net) with 63 in the first one, 3 in
the second and 9 in the last one. Notably, from the domains
that resolved to the same one listed in A1K (34), almost half
of them (16) belonged to porn web sites. The rest 18 of them
belonged to 11 web pages, including Wikipedia, Instagram
and mega.
Country IPs Country IPs Country IPs
DE 238 CA 5 AT 1
US 146 SG 3 HK 1
CN 20 GB 2 IT 1
FR 12 NL 2 SE 1
RU 9 SC 2 TW 1
TABLE 5. Distribution by country
B. THE NAMECOIN DATA
Namecoin was the first widely used Blockchain DNS, be-
coming a reference point for more recent approaches such
as Emercoin and Blockstack. This blockchain manages the
32https://www.opennic.org/
registrar of the .bit TLD through a straightforward pro-
cedure, in which users specify the SLD that they wish to
register (which will be later appended with a .bit), as well
as the resolving IP and other secondary parameters. At the
time of writing this article, Namecoin has a total of 106,659
active domains (i.e. they have been recently created or pe-
riodically renewed by their owners). Nevertheless, despite
the restrictions imposed by the registrar procedure and the
data structure template to be added in the blockchain as
well as the deviant behaviour of some users, we found some
relevant statistics that showcase the potential of Namecoin as
a platform to impulse illicit activities.
As a foreseeable tendency, most users opted for registering
domains of low length (from the set of domains offered
by ICANN, practically all SLDs with length lower than six
are already registered or reserved), as described in Figure
3. As already discussed, this hinders procedures such as
AGD detection. Clearly, the fact that a domain has to be
renewed every certain time at a small cost, a feature which
is not implemented in Emercoin, prevents the ownership of
domains for long periods if there is no revenue. Nevertheless,
this does not seem a constraint for some users, as seen
in Table 6. More concretely, more than 87,000 addresses
registered at least one domain, yet there are users that own
more than 1,000 domains, which often contain the words sex,
porn, stream, hack as well as other SLDs from well-known
brands and companies. Although most of them do not resolve
to an IP, this may change in almost real-time with a simple
update. Finally, it is worthwhile noting that the intersection
of the SLDs of the TOP1m SLDs with the unique SLDs
registered in Namecoin is 32,446 and if we count the naming
variations (lower/capitals) 32,865, which account for 30,81%
of the 106,659 registered domains. Again, using dnstwist,
we identified 6,299 domains that belong to A1K and whose
names have been registered with different typo variations.
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FIGURE 3. Length distribution of domain names registered in Namecoin. Note
that values are represented in logarithmic scale.
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Namecoin address # domains
MyZTAGS74akZBiqYPKuvD3zGCfL8tGmXpz 1900
N256bGgH4E84P8fcEcLs4m1YCXYZb6nzAm 43
NJ6HHqGu9mmW25XgyGoj7V6hPoCSkQLnQ6 40
MwyGuUCawVzCcCSoNJpWjN1Kcioq7TNM92 17
MzB1bm2QDmqpmAKeaRPev4QxAxTWj1kZRi 7
MwAaZiRFGiVcTfVh2bJsHN5WXTEctocjjY 6
NAfxmnNyNoXTxCXtp3R7TZdy1SVqu885ax 4
N2pF7NKSQG73fUkgq9ZSxsjGAHnRH81P7D 4
MyFUY4gCVGYs7TfNxxuGNaf2k6hqrQEkcy 4
NHtkpFy3yWWYsAwbkEUSr1uwFXX57xded3 3
TABLE 6. Top 10 addresses in Namecoin with most registered domains.
C. THE EMERCOIN DATA
Emercoin blockchain is one of the most well-known services
for domain registration. In total, the blockchain contains
54,210 records at the time of writing. Interestingly, although
the naming requirements of Emercoin specify that only low-
ercase alphanumeric ASCII characters are allowed, the chain
contains case sensitive domains not only for the advertised
TLDs but for standard TLDs like .com. The distribution
of the domains is illustrated in Table 7. In this regard, we
observed that most of the addresses registered one or two
domains (i.e. more than 43,500 addresses registered at least
one domain in Emercoin), while some addresses registered
more than 1,000 domains, as showed in Table 8. Many of
these records contained an IP, an email address, or a note
advertising that the domain is for sale. More concretely, by
querying the Emercoin blockchain, we found that up to 617
domains contain the words “for sale” in their value field, and
in most cases an email to contact. Moreover, when searching
for “$" in the value field, the search returned more than
100 domains with a specific sale value. Finally, correlating
the A1K dataset with the Emercoin chain returned 1,045
domains, which correspond to 328 unique SLDs registered
with different TLD variants. The intersection of the SLDs
of the TOP1m SLDs with the unique SLDs registered in
Emercoin is 12,214 and if we count the naming varia-
tions (lower/capitals and different TLDs) 31,587, which is
58.27% of the 54,210 registered domains. Moreover, using
dnstwist33 we identified 9,634 domains that belong to
A1K and whose names have been registered with different
typo variations (typosquatting).
Feature Registered domains
.com TLD 44
Punycode (xn–) 1261
Capital letters 316
Whitespace character 35
TABLE 7. Lexical statistics for domain names registered in Emercoin.
The domain name length distribution is depicted in Figure
4. Notably, most of the domains have lengths below five, with
three letters being the most registered domains (as in the
33https://github.com/elceef/dnstwist
Emercoin address # domains
ETkxi1X1CeX2QDSWp3CDmuDj7jJZtftfNF 4255
EKzDF4RAHat8tWdQGbvR9zm7PJrHcth7Rm 3068
EUKa9nrsqX8udF8UpfCGLcYQG8cfT98ZvT 707
EQADxQhroZwGnQAyirFtNbwwjoykciFqv3 253
EYBExDLR3aqZunRj6NuyRC9TXt8NHKKXWZ 196
ENnpjY8YQr5rvKNc1TY6kkBwsDZXwmEiY2 150
EWwX61CW9TorzZ7Dy1dmnfKYPxz7dBMGxJ 137
EaQkdxCMPVzMXtTFqYaQxV7wQ1qqLy8aXF 58
ELRNsgvTbV83MyPdD5ACf1xyemLFV7Sued 53
ESCWovPDaX55KCpX3bdkKWqbH4zBEiwNrd 46
TABLE 8. Top 10 addresses in Emercoin with most registered domains.
case of Namecoin). As previously stated, these SLD are no
longer available in ICANN, since they are already registered,
and are among the first to be registered once a new TLD
appears. Given the high correlation with ICANN domains,
it is expected that many of them, if they do not belong to the
corresponding ICANN owners, are highly likely to be used
for malicious activities such as phishing or cybersquatting.
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FIGURE 4. Length distribution of domain names registered in Emercoin. Note
that values are represented in logarithmic scale.
Finally, some statistics of the domain registering behaviour
over time are depicted in Figure 5, which shows the domains
registered from the beginning of the blockchain up to March
2020. Notably, we can see some peaks in its lifetime.
The distribution over time of the domains registered with
.com was also explored. As seen in Figure 6, such prac-
tices, although not alarmingly numerous, are still active in
2020. Therefore, the registrar system still allows anybody
to register domains with TLDs different than those offered
by Emercoin. This situation can enable several of the threats
presented earlier, such as the vulnerabilities with the underly-
ing registrar, which in turn may enable malware and phishing
campaigns, as well as cybersquatting.
Finally, global statistics for Namecoin and Emercoin were
produced. Currently, there are more than 140K domain
names registered in both blockchains, but only 5,266 have
an IP address associated with them in their registrar blocks
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FIGURE 5. Timeline of registered domains in Emercoin. Note that values are
represented in logarithmic scale.
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FIGURE 6. Timeline of .com domains registered in Emercoin.
34. Out of these 5,266, we computed the distribution of TLDs
(Table 9). We can observe that most of the domains belong to
.coin, .bit, .lib, .bazar, and .emc. Note that some
of the other TLDs should not be “available", considering
the whitespace character. Next, we explored the distribution
of IP addresses controlling these domains, according to the
data contained in the blockchain. In this regard, the top 15
IPs used for that purpose are described in Table 10. We
observe that 192.243.100.192 is the IP address to which most
domains resolve (i.e. a total of 1957 domains).
In order to go a step further and explore whether the
information contained in the blockchain is valid from a
domain to IP address resolution perspective, we extracted all
the domains and IP addresses from Namecoin and Emercoin
and attempted to resolve them. Surprisingly, the results indi-
cated that there were only 273 and 471 unique IPs resolving
Namecoin and Emercoin domains, respectively. The latter
supports the data illustrated in Table 10, where there are
multiple domains hosted by only a few IPs. However, there
might be cases where domain data have not been properly
registered or updated in these chains.
V. DISCUSSION AND COUNTERMEASURES
Arguably, the aforementioned threats seem to portray an ob-
scure future. In what follows, we propose a set of mitigation
strategies and mechanisms for each of the identified threats.
As identified, Emercoin registrar allows some theoretically
forbidden patterns and characters, including the .com TLDs.
These practices, although uncommon, are still active, as seen
in Figure 6. In the case of Namecoin, the periodic renewal
mechanism, as well as the fact of only controlling one TLD,
allows a higher degree of control. Yet, both blockchains have
34https://blockchain-dns.info/explorer/
TLD Number TLD Number TLD Number
coin 1261 $ 1 net 1
bit 1045 oz 1 ln 1
lib 1017 1 in 1
bazar 998 bbs 1 9988 1
emc 861 news 1 kib 1
i2p 19 ua 1 fashion 1
neo 14 luxsocks 1 woshiwo321 1
com 8 mayun 1 name 1
onion 3 years 1 www 1
cn 3 pi 1 cion 1
coin 2 aaatttaaa 1 mec 1
eth 2 io 1 su 1
enc 1 liib 1 biz 1
org 1 linux 1 1010 1
TABLE 9. Distribution of TLDs resolving to an IP in both Emercoin and
Namecoin.
IPs Domains IPs Domains
192.243.100.192 1957 78.107.255.15 53
144.76.12.6 448 192.241.241.153 45
202.108.22.5 402 202.108.8.82 45
192.227.233.13 340 81.2.247.158 45
178.128.220.134 144 94.242.60.7 37
185.31.209.8 88 185.61.138.167 32
178.32.148.152 67 46.29.251.130 29
92.63.101.1 53
TABLE 10. Top 15 IPs to which domains resolve in both Emercoin and
Namecoin.
similar patterns and user behaviours as analysed in Sections
IV-B and IV-C. As such, more robust mechanisms have to be
implemented in the future to avoid deviant behaviours. These
mechanisms should cover the whole registrar procedure in
an end-to-end manner, from the auction systems (e.g. with
robust smart contracts and revocation mechanisms, triggered
following a condition such as a majority vote) to the proper
checking of the data structures stored in the blockchain so
that malicious/unexpected information cannot be inserted.
Other solutions and functionalities such as forks, which will
be later described for the case of the immutability threat,
could also be adopted.
In the case of cybersquatting, several strategies have been
implemented by systems like Handshake, in which they pre-
reserve the top 100k Alexa domains. Other similar policies
may be implemented in future decentralised DNS systems
as well as a controlled flow of domains being registered, to
prevent users from registering arbitrary amounts of domains.
Due to the unrestricted nature of Blockchain DNS systems,
users may register the most used SLDs and append one of the
multiple TLDs offered by the new blockchain DNS registrars.
As previously stated, the appearance of blockchain DNS
systems which aim to register and resolve all the domain
spectrum (both in terms of SLDs and TLDs), may create dif-
ferent versions of the Internet. In this scenario, the challenge
of controlling the domain name registration as well as the
resolution will require unprecedented security and privacy
mechanisms.
The email had always accommodated a noteworthy attack
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surface due to the lack of security considerations since its
inception. The evolution of email security at some point
called upon the DNS infrastructure in an attempt to prevent
certain types of spam and phishing. Email security policies
and protocols such as the Sender Policy Framework (SPF),
Domain Keys Identified Mail (DKIM) and Domain Message
Authentication Reporting (DMARC) which depend upon
DNS can be extended and adapted to force checks on do-
mains and prevent domain spoofing attempts. In addition, the
email clients should include scanning and checking function-
ality to distinguish between the different emerging parallel
Internets attributed to different blockchain DNS entries. The
email servers (and MTAs in general) could enforce tighter
policies by requiring properly configured DMARC services.
In essence, the email ecosystem could act in this instance
as the gatekeeper prior to entering the blockchain DNS
controlled realm.
The decentralised nature of blockchain DNS is expected to
change and improve the botnets’ C2 communication channels
by providing more effective Rendez-vous algorithms than the
current DGAs. Fewer NXDomain responses, covert channels
and encrypted communications are expected. Traffic analy-
sis, similar to the one described by [7], is expected to be
less effective. This new state of play would require more
proactive approaches such as hunting for synthesised IoC
type of patterns in the blockchain itself, not only limited in
the domain information but also all available metadata. The
immutability of the blockchain would allow to continuously
and reliably study the botnets’ modus operandi and respond
with mitigation actions.
The immutability of blockchains requires other approaches
to counter malicious records. Although less popular, forks
are a well-known mechanism to “delete” data from the
blockchain [62]. Nevertheless, forks are used only in ex-
ceptional cases and are not considered to be an efficient
solution, since they add a prohibitive overhead to the system,
especially if the number of deletion requests is high. Other
strategies regarding the block consolidation mechanism (the
number of blocks created in front of the actual block for
it to be considered safe) can also be explored, yet, again,
they could hinder the efficiency of the system. In terms
of blockchains, technical efforts to circumvent immutability
while preserving their inherent security are steadily emerging
[62].
Finally, it should be emphasised that for such initiatives
to become mainstream and not a tool for cybercrime, they
need to build trust in their services. At their current form, it
is evident that both Namecoin and Emercoin have already a
number of issues as their users face privacy and security chal-
lenges. Therefore, moderation solutions must be developed
to protect the reputation of the emerging ecosystem. The
moderation may prevent poisoning of the chains and removal
of malicious records making the users trust the provided
services.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
When a disruptive technology such as blockchain enters the
realms of one of the core Internet services such as DNS, it is
imperative that the security community invests a significant
amount of effort to study and investigate the security implica-
tions. The DNS hijacking incident back in 2014 where 300K
routers were compromised35, albeit having a high impact to
businesses, is minuscule compared to the potential damage
malicious actors can cause when the blockchain DNS be-
comes widely accepted.
This paper attempted to tessellate the emerging threats and
provide insight into the associated risks introduced by mov-
ing from a centralised to a fully decentralised DNS. From
a forensic investigation perspective, the use of blockchain
is a mixed blessing; on the one hand, some of the evidence
will be stored in a forensically sound manner. On the other,
the introduction of yet another technology into the Internet
backbone will not only increase the complexity leading to
a potentially wider attack surface but will also result in
significant attribution challenges.
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